Why do the poor vote against redistribution? We experimentally examine one explanation, namely that individuals gain direct expressive utility from voting in accordance with their ideology and understand they are unlikely to be pivotal; hence, their expressive utility, even if arbitrarily small, entirely determines their voting behavior. In contrast with a basic prediction of this explanation, we …nd that the probability of being pivotal does not a¤ect the impact of monetary interest on whether a subject votes for redistribution.
The angry workers, mighty in their numbers, are marching irresistibly against the arrogant. They are shaking their …sts at the sons of privilege . . . They are massing at the gates of Mission Hills, hoisting the black ‡ag, and while the millionaires tremble in their mansions, they are bellowing out their terrifying demands. "We are here," they scream, "to cut your taxes."
-Thomas Frank, What's the Matter with Kansas
In democracies, a majority of individuals earn incomes well-below the average and yet vote against redistributive measures. Why do the poor not expropriate the rich through redistribution?
Given that across countries the mean income is invariably above the median, the answer to this question is crucial for understanding the political economy of redistributive taxation.
There are several, not necessarily mutually exclusive, potential explanations of the fact that the poor often vote against redistribution. The poor might believe that redistributive policies are persistent and expect that in the future they, or their children, will earn more than the average income; they thus oppose redistribution because they expect it would hurt them in the future.
Prevalence of such beliefs may be due to overoptimism, but as Bénabou and Ok (2001) show, is in principle also consistent with rational expectations. Or, the poor may believe that the economic activity by the wealthy, which would be diminished by taxation, imposes positive externalities on the poor. Or, the political process bundles redistributive policies with other issues, such as religion, so that the poor have no means of voting solely on their redistributive preferences (Roemer 1998 ). This explanation is hard to reconcile, however, with the broad popular support of isolated redistributive measures. A large majority of the population supports the repeal of the Federal Estate Tax even though this tax is levied on less than 1% of the population (Krupnikov et al. 2006) . Similarly, in a 2000 referendum, over 80% of South Dakota voters supported the repeal of the state inheritance tax.
Another explanation is that the poor may …nd redistribution unjust and hence vote against it even though this hurts them materially. 1 The idea that ideological preferences may be the primary driver of voting behavior is particularly potent if these ideological preferences are over the 1 The possibility that individuals vote in accordance with their individual notion of justice could also account for the fact that some wealthy people vote for redistributive policies.
individual's vote rather than over the electoral outcome. In expressive voting models (e.g., Tullock 1971 , Brennan and Buchanan 1984 , Brennan and Hamlin 1988 , a vote cast by an individual a¤ects her welfare in two ways: directly, by the expressive utility of the vote, and indirectly, through the vote's possible impact on the outcome of the election. A key feature of such preferences is that even if expressive utility is small, in su¢ ciently large elections the probability that a vote is pivotal will be smaller still, which means that expressive utility will fully determine behavior.
Formally, suppose there is an odd number n of voters. Each voter i has an exogenous wealth endowment e i 2 [0; e] and an exogenous ideological type i 2 . Each voter chooses an action a i 2 fredistribute; statusQuog. In order to introduce some uncertainty about the outcome of the election, we suppose that each action is "miscounted"with some probability p 2 0; 1 2 . Speci…cally, voter i's vote v i 2 fredistribute; statusQuog is equal to her action a i with probability 1 p and equal to the other action with probability p. Note that p can be arbitrarily close to zero. The possibility of a miscount eliminates the multiplicity of equilibria and ensures that in large elections each voter has a dominant strategy. 2 The exogenous endowments are fully and frictionlessly 3 redistributed if the majority of votes v i are redistribute; otherwise, the original endowments are maintained. We focus on these two extreme schemes solely for the ease of exposition. Considering a richer set of proportional redistributive schemes would not substantively change the analysis. 4 Let w i (v i ; v i ; e i ) denote voter i's …nal wealth after the election:
As we mentioned earlier, there are two components to each individual's utility function. One component captures preferences over the outcome of the election: each voter has an increasing 2 The miscounts are in the same spirit as the trembling-hand perfection re…nement (Selten 1975) . We cannot, however, simply use perfect equilibria instead of introducing the miscounts because the requisite n in the statement of Proposition 1 depends on p.
3 Making the model more realistic by accounting for deadweight loss, government ine¢ ciency, and lobbying costs inherent in redistribution would only make it easier to explain votes against redistributive policies.
4 If we allow for arbitrary non-linear redistribution schemes, however, there would be no equilibrium in pure strategies. See the discussion in Bénabou and Ok (2001) on the restriction to the two extreme schemes. utility function over her …nal wealth, u (w i ). We refer to this as her material utility. The second component captures her expressive utility: agent of type i gets utility v (a i ; i ) from taking action a i . 5 She receives this utility regardless of the outcome of the election. We assume that every type has a discrete expressive preference for one of the actions: 9 > 0 s.t. 8 2 , jv (redistribute; ) v (statusQuo; )j . 6 Let " denote the strength of expressive utility. Voter i's total utility is
We can now formally express the idea that in large elections ideology fully determines behavior even if the expressive component of the overall utility is arbitrarily small.
Proposition 1 For any " > 0, if n is large enough there is a unique equilibrium where each player
The formal proof is in the Appendix. The basic intuition, however, is straightforward. Given any ", if the election is large enough, the probability that any given voter is pivotal, say q, becomes so small that " jv (redistribute; ) v (statusQuo; )j is necessarily greater than q u (e i ) u
Hence, the dominant strategy for each voter is to maximize her expressive utility.
The appeal of the expressive voting model is that it can account for seemingly puzzling outcomes (the poor voting against redistribution) even with preferences that are arbitrarily close to the standard sel…sh, materialist kind. 7 The expressive voting model also makes a clear prediction that voters would behave di¤erently if they knew they were going to be pivotal. In fact, for small ", a voter who knew her choice would be implemented would largely ignore her ideology and instead maximize her material utility.
In this paper, we experimentally examine this feature of expressive voting models. We conduct a laboratory experiment where we elicit subjects' ideological preferences and then give them an opportunity to vote on whether to redistribute exogenously assigned income. We randomize the 5 It would make no di¤erence if we instead assume that the expressive utility depends on the counted vote vi. 6 This assumption guarantees that, in large elections, every voter maximizes only her expressive utility. Weaker assumptions would su¢ ce to ensure that the fraction of voters who maximize only their expressive utility converges to 1 as the number of voters goes to in…nity.
7 Gelman et al. (forthcoming) estimate that in the 2008 US presidential election, the probability of being pivotal was at most around 1 in 10 million. Hence, if a weakly risk-averse voter were to gain even a million dollars from Obama's election, 10 cents worth of ideology would su¢ ce to induce a vote for McCain. subjects into three conditions. Voters cast votes in a 9-subject referendum and the majority rule is implemented. Dictators choose the outcome directly for their 9-subject group, while the other 8 subjects in those groups, the peons, are merely surveyed on what they would, hypothetically, choose if they were the dictator. Hence, dictators are pivotal with probability one, peons are pivotal with probability zero, and voters are pivotal with an ambiguous probability, which ex post turned out to be around 1/3.
We …nd that both material interest and ideology strongly impact the subjects' votes. The subjects who materially bene…t from redistribution are three times as likely to vote for it than those who lose money from it. The subjects' indicated attitudes toward redistribution are also highly predictive of their choices. The subjects who express a strong belief that government should increase redistributive taxation are more than twice as likely to vote for redistribution than the subjects who express a strong belief that the government should lower redistributive taxes.
These relationships, however, do not vary across voters, dictators, and peons as predicted by expressive voting models. While dictators'choices are indeed somewhat less sensitive to ideology, the main implication of expressive voting models does not hold: the probability of being pivotal does not a¤ect the impact of material interest on whether a subject votes for redistribution. We also …nd, again in contrast with predictions of expressive voting models, that subjects with stronger ideological views are no less sensitive to their material interest.
These …ndings cast doubt on the possibility that the observed patterns on redistributive voting can be explained with a minimal departure from standard preferences through the mechanism highlighted by Proposition 1. In fact, the lack of responsiveness of the impact of material interest to the probability that the subject is pivotal is di¢ cult to reconcile with any model where preferences have a substantial expressive component. We discuss potential interpretations of our results in Section 3.
Our paper contributes to the empirical literature on preferences over redistributive policies. Putterman (1997) surveys some of the potential explanations for why the poor do not expropriate the rich and assesses the ability of these explanations to account for observed empirical patterns. Frank (2004) provides an account of political strategies used to create a bundling between taxation and other issues; the consequences of such bundling are theoretically explored by Roemer (1998) .
In these papers, the ideological preferences of the poor are assumed to be substantive. 8 Our paper is more closely related to the literature that tests the predictions of expressive voting models (where ideological preferences can be small) by examining the impact of pivotality on voting behavior. 9 Sobel and Wagner (2004) report that the level of public welfare spending as a share of state expenditures decreases with the theoretical probability that a given voter in that state is pivotal. 10 They interpret this as support for the expressive voting model, but given that their variation in pivotality comes solely from the variation in state population, this interpretation is questionable. 11 Carter and Guerette (1992) conduct an experiment where a small number of subjects choose between $6 (or in some conditions $9) in cash and a $2 donation to charity. Carter and Guerette vary the probability with which the subject's choice is implemented and …nd mixed results on whether a higher probability of being pivotal increases the preference for cash over the donation. A similar, but within-subject, design was implemented by Fischer (1996) ; his analysis, however, excludes all subjects whose behavior was una¤ected by pivotality, so the results are di¢ cult to interpret. 12 Cummins et al. (1997) …nd that more subjects vote to donate $10 to an environmental project in a hypothetical referendum than in a real one. 13 Tyran (2004) examines the relationship between subjective expectations about the material consequences of votes and subjects'behavior and …nds that the observed relationship does not conform to the predictions of expressive voting models. Dittmann et al. (2009) …nd that subjects'willingness to pay for a right to vote appears inconsistent with both instrumental and expressive motivations for voting.
Our paper is most closely related to Feddersen et al. (2009) and Shayo and Harel (2010) . In both of those papers the authors conduct an experiment where subjects vote for either a sel…sh 8 Edlin et al. (2009) consider a model where voters have social, rather than ideological, preferences. Since those preferences scale with the size of the electorate, they are large precisely when the chance of being pivotal is low. Hence, in such a model, the expected utility of voting a certain way is potentially independent of pivotality.
9 There is also a small literature that examines correlations between voting and other expressive behaviors, …nding that voters are not only more likely to wear political buttons and place political signs in front of their house (Copeland and Laband 2002) , but also more likely to post signs supporting their local football team (Laband et al. 2008) .
1 0 Under a simple modi…cation of a model from Mueller (1989) , they drive this probability to be
where n is the number of voters. 1 1 Their speci…cation does include a linear control for log(P opulation), but this does not fully solve the identi…cation problem.
1 2 In addition, he incorrectly computes the probabilities of being pivotal; in the condition where a subject's name is drawn at random and then his or her decision is implemented for certain, his analysis codes the probability of being pivotal as equal to 1 even though subjects make their decisions before the name is drawn.
1 3 Haab et al. (1999) , however, argue that this result might re ‡ect only a di¤erence in the variance of responses across the conditions rather than a di¤erence in the average willingness to give. option or a more ethical option, 14 and the probability that a voter is pivotal is exogenously varied.
As predicted by expressive voting models, both papers …nd that the fraction of votes that are sel…sh increases in the probability that a voter is pivotal. 15 This …nding stands in sharp contrast with our results. We …nd that probability of being pivotal does not a¤ect the tendency to vote in one's material self-interest. The main di¤erence between the designs is that in our experiment what the 'ethical'option is varies based on the political ideology of the subject. 16 Given our interest in redistributive policies, this formulation more closely mimics the options voters face in the …eld. In future work it would be worthwhile to explore whether this particular di¤erence in the designs is what accounts for the di¤erences in our results.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the experimental design. Section 2 reports the results. We discuss and conclude in Section 3.
Experimental design
The experiment was conducted at Northwestern University. Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate subject pool. 17 The subjects went through the protocol in groups of nine. At the outset of the experiment, subjects were given a survey which elicited whether they believe the death penalty is moral, whether they support gun laws, whether they believe the poor are unmotivated or unlucky, whether they believe the government should engage in more or less redistributive taxation, and whether they are pro-life or pro-choice. All questions were presented using a 7-point Likert item. Our primary interest is in the subjects'belief about whether the poor are unmotivated or unlucky and in their views on whether there should be more or less redistributive taxation. The other questions were primarily …ller items. The facsimile of the survey is provided in the Appendix.
After the survey, the subjects played …ve rounds of rock-paper-scissors against the experi-menter. 18 A subject would score 3 points in each round for beating the experimenter, 1 point for a draw, and 0 points if the experimenter beat her. The experimenter uniformly randomized across the three actions in each round, independently of subjects'previous play. Hence, subjects' overall performance was randomly assigned. 19 Note, however, that the subjects who play similar strategies would have similar performance; therefore, performance is not independently drawn across subjects. Our statistical analyses are conducted under the assumption that any common component in subjects'strategies is orthogonal to their redistributive preferences.
The subjects were divided into three tiers based on the rank of their performance in the game.
To determine rank the experimenter randomly broke any ties in performance. The subjects in the top tier (those ranked 1-3) earned $15, those in the middle tier (ranked 4-6) earned $10, and those in the bottom tier (ranked 7-9) earned $5. The subjects were not physically given the money right after the game, but were told that these are their "earnings from the game."
Next, the subjects were presented with a question about whether the earnings from the game should be redistributed so that every subject gets $10. The decision-making procedure varied across the conditions. In …ve of the groups, the decision on whether to redistribute the money was reached by a majority-vote referendum. We refer to the 45 the subjects in these groups as voters.
They were given a slip of paper that said:
Each of the members of the whole group will now vote on whether to redistribute the money equally across all participants. The option the majority selects will be the …nal decision. You have the chance to vote to redistribute the money so that everyone receives an equal amount or to keep the payments the same. Votes remain anonymous.
What do you choose?
In 46 others groups, the decision on whether to redistribute the money was made by a single subject, selected at random. We refer to these 46 subjects, whose decision are implemented for certain, as dictators. The assignment to dictatorship was block randomized so there are equally 1 8 Rock-paper-scissors is a game with two players. The players simultaneously choose one of three actions: rock (a clenched …st), paper (an open hand with all …ngers extended) or scissors (a hand with index and middle …ngers extended and separated). A rock beats scissors; scissors beat paper; paper beats rock. If both players choose the same action, the round is counted as a draw.
1 9 Many subjects, however, especially those who had done well, said they believe that skill played a part in determining performance. We explain below how this belief was elicited.
many dictators who earned $5, $10, and $15 in the game. Dictators were given a slip of paper that said:
One among you is a dictator: s/he will decide whether to redistribute the money equally across all participants. You ARE the dictator. You have the chance to redistribute the money so that everyone receives an equal amount or keep the payments the same. The dictator remains anonymous. What do you choose?
Finally, the remaining 368 subjects in the 46 dictatorial groups were certain to have no impact on whether redistribution took place. We refer to these subjects as peons. 20 They were simply asked what they would do, hypothetically, if they were the dictator:
One among you is a dictator: s/he will decide whether to redistribute the money equally across all participants. You are NOT the dictator. Imagine that you had the chance to redistribute the money so that everyone receives an equal amount or keep the payments the same. The dictator remains anonymous. What would you choose?
Each subject indicated his or her answer by circling the word REDISTRIBUTE or circling the words KEEP SAME. After the subjects made this choice, we administered one additional survey question, asking the subjects to what extent they "think that a participant's performance in the rock-paper-scissors segment of the study is due to luck or skill," using a 7-point Likert item. 21 After this survey, the subjects were informed whether redistribution was implemented, were given their earnings in cash, and the experiment ended.
Results
We begin our analysis with balancing tests. As Table 1 indicates, voters, dictators, and peons gave similar answers to the questions about whether the poor are unlucky or unmotivated and about 2 0 Subjects signed up for particular time slots which were randomized to a referendum procedure or a dictatorship procedure. If there are subject characteristics that a¤ect preferences for both time slots and for redistribution, this would lower the true precision of our estimates of the e¤ect of being a voter. This issue does not a¤ect our comparison of dictators and peons.
2 1 We did not ask this question of the …rst group of subjects. Hence, data on the answer to this question is missing for 9 out of the 459 subjects.
whether the government should engage in more or less redistribution. The mean answer to those two questions does not vary much across the three conditions and, as the Mann-Whitney tests indicate, neither does the overall distributions of answers. There were also no noticeable di¤erences across the conditions in the answers to other survey questions; we do not report the details of those tests. The assignment to being a dictator was block-randomized by earnings, so voters, dictators, and peons are perfectly balanced on earnings. Finally, Table 1 shows that the randomization of earnings is well-balanced on ideology; the distribution of answers to the survey questions is not substantially di¤erent for those who earned $5, $10, and $15. Hence, the randomization of both roles and earnings worked well. Table 1 also shows the summary statistics on redistribution choices. Of the 459 subjects, 49% voted for redistribution. The percentage of subjects who did so was not signi…cantly di¤erent across the roles: 47% of voters, 54% of dictators, and 49% of peons voted for redistribution. 22 Does ideology, as measured by the subjects' answers to the survey, correlate with subjects' behavior? Figures 1 and 2 show the fraction of subjects who voted for redistribution for each answer to the questions about whether the poor are unmotivated or unlucky and whether there should be more or less redistributive taxation. Each of the questions strongly predicts subjects' behavior. Those who believe the poor are unmotivated and those who believe the government should lower taxes are far less likely to vote for redistribution than those who believe the poor are unlucky and those who believe the government should raise taxes. An OLS regression indicates that the relationship between the answer to each of the questions and the voting behavior is highly signi…cant (both p-values < 0.001). 23 As Figure 3 shows, answers to the less directly related ideological question about whether the death penalty is immoral also predict voting behavior. 24 The result in Figure 1 echoes Fong's (2001) …nding that, in a Gallup survey, belief that poverty 2 2 The 95% con…dence interval rules that the di¤erence in the likelihood of voting for redistribution is greater than 21 percentage points across any two conditions. 2 3 The correlation between the answers to the two questions is also highly signi…cant (p < 0.001). When answers to both questions are included in the same regression, each has a signi…cant independent e¤ect (both p-values < 0.02).
Impact of material interest and ideology in the full sample
2 4 This relationship is highly signi…cant (p < 0.001). Once we control for views on the motivation of the poor and vies on redistributive taxation, however, the impact of the views on the death penalty becomes only marginally signi…cant (p = 0.07).
is caused by bad luck correlates with stated preferences for redistribution. This result also suggests that those who (mistakenly) believe that performance in rock-paper-scissors is due to skill should be less likely to vote for redistribution. Figure 4 con…rms this relationship. Those who performed better in the game, however, are more likely to think that their performance was due to skill. For example, as Table 1 shows, the subjects who earned $15 believe that the role of skill is roughly half a standard deviation greater than the subjects who earned $5 (p < 0.001). Hence, the relationship in Figure 4 could be simply due to the correlation between material interests and the belief about skill. As we can see in Table 2 , however, even once we fully control for earnings, those subjects who think performance is more due to skill are less likely to redistribute (p = 0.041). The size of this e¤ect, however, is somewhat small: a one standard deviation increase in the belief that skill matters reduces the likelihood of voting for redistribution by 4.43 percentage points. We do not …nd any signi…cant interactions between beliefs about the role of skill and the impact of earnings or ideology on votes.
How does material interest a¤ect subjects' votes? As Table 1 shows, of those subjects who would gain from redistribution (those with $5 earnings), 75% voted for it. Of the subjects whose material outcome would be una¤ected by redistribution (those with $10 earnings), 50% voted for it. Finally, of those who would lose from redistribution (those with $15 earnings), 23% voted for it. In other words, for every dollar that a subject stands to gain from redistribution, his or her probability of voting for redistribution increases by 5 percentage points. Figure 5 shows the fraction of the subjects who voted for redistribution by their performance rank. Recall that those with rank 1 through 3 earned $15, those with rank 4 through 6 earned $10, and those with rank 7 through 9 earned $5. It is clear from Figure 5 that subjects'performance a¤ects their willingness to vote for redistribution only through its impact on their earnings.
We next examine whether the impact of earnings on votes varies with the ideology of the subject. The simple model we presented in the introduction suggests that those subjects with a stronger ideological stance should be less sensitive to their earnings than those with a more moderate ideological stance. To examine this prediction, we run a separate regression for each answer to the question about whether the poor are unmotivated or unlucky and for each answer to the question about whether the government should tax more or less using a linear probability model:
where Vote i is an indicator variable for whether subject i voted for redistribution and the variable GainFromRedistribution i takes on values -5, 0, or 5, and is determined by subject i's performance in the rock-paper-scissors game. Figure 6 depicts the coe¢ cients and their con…dence intervals for these fourteen regressions. Very few subjects (5 out of the 459 subjects) indicated the strongest possible belief that the poor are unmotivated; accordingly, the con…dence interval in that regression is very large. Apart from that imprecisely estimated coe¢ cient, the impact of earnings on voting behavior is remarkably stable across ideological attitudes, whether measured by the answer to the question about motivation or the question about taxation. 25 Hence, the interaction between the strength of ideological conviction and the impact of material interest on voting behavior does not provide support for the expressive voting model.
Pivotality
A more direct test of the expressive voting model is to compare the impact of ideology and material interest across voters, peons, and dictators. As we mentioned earlier, these groups vary greatly in the probability that their decision is pivotal. For voters, that probability is ambiguous but interior between zero and one. For peons, that probability is zero. For dictators, the probability of being pivotal is one: a dictator's choice is always implemented. We …rst look at the impact of ideology across the three roles. Figure 7 shows how the likelihood a subject votes for redistribution varies with the answer to the question about the motivation of the poor for each of the three roles. This scatter plot suggests a broadly similar e¤ect of ideology across voters, peons, and dictators. The …rst three columns in Table 3 We now turn to the main test of the expressive voting model: we examine whether the willingness to vote against one's own material self-interest depends on the probability that one's vote is pivotal. Are the dictators, who have to put their money where their vote is, more likely to vote for redistribution when it pro…ts them, and less likely to do so when it costs them, compared to voters and peons? Table 4 reports the outcome of the linear probability model in Equation (1) for voters, dictators, and peons. As the table shows, the coe¢ cients on GainFromRedistribution are quite similar across the three roles: 0.067, 0.048, and 0.050, respectively. These di¤erences are not signi…cant, and the small di¤erences that are present do not line up with the predictions of the expressive voting model. 26 The linear probability model in Equation (1), however, belies some di¤erences in the impact of GainFromRedistribution across the roles. Figure 9 shows the fraction of subjects who voted for redistribution for each level of earnings and each role. It is clear from the …gure that even though with a linear speci…cation the impact of earnings on the choices of voters is similar as for the other two roles, voters who earn $5 and $10 do behave di¤erently from peons and dictators with those earnings. Speci…cally, voters who strictly gain from redistribution are somewhat more likely to vote for it than peons or dictators (p = 0.079), and voters whose material interest is una¤ected by redistribution are far less likely to vote for it than peons or dictators (p = 0.015). Figure 9 also reveals that dictators and peons, who are most dissimilar in their pivotality, behave very similarly at each level of earnings. 27 This suggests that the di¤erence in the behavior of voters is due to something other than their interior probability of being pivotal.
3 Discussion and conclusion
Voting in elections seems like a form of cheap talk with one's conscience. The chance that any given voter is pivotal is typically so small that a vote is largely a declaration of one's views without material consequences. If voters get some expressive utility from this declaration, expressive preferences, rather than material interests, would drive voting behavior in equilibrium.
Our experiment created an environment where subjects'ideology has a strong impact on their willingness to vote for redistribution and their material interests were randomly assigned. We …nd that the subjects whose decisions are implemented for certain are no more sensitive to their material interest than the subjects who are unlikely to be pivotal, or even than the subjects who are certain not to be pivotal.
What models of voter behavior are consistent with this …nding? First note that our results cannot be dismissed by concerns that $5 might be an irrelevantly small amount of money or that our measure of ideology might be too rough, because both our monetary stakes and our measure of ideology have a very strong impact on subjects' behavior. For instance, when redistribution reduces a subject's income by $5, he or she is three times less likely to vote for redistribution than when it increases his or her income by $5. Hence, small stakes cannot possibly account for our …ndings.
Another possibility is that individuals do not understand the notion that their decision is not always implemented and behave as if their probability of being pivotal were …xed. Previous work provides mixed evidence on this view. Levine and Palfrey (2007) …nd experimental support for several comparative statics predictions of the rational voter model. Du¤y and Tavits (2008) …nd that subjects'subjective assessment of the probability they will be pivotal predicts whether they will vote. Blais et al. (2000) , however, show that turnout levels are correlated with the expected closeness of the election only for those voters who have a relatively weak sense that voting is a duty. Similarly, using data on union representation elections, Farber (2009) reports that over 80%
of individuals vote independently of the likelihood they will be pivotal, while only the remaining 20% respond to the election size and the expected closeness of the election outcome. 28
Another way to explain our results is to assume that there is substantial heterogeneity in the importance of expressive utility across the subjects. Suppose, for instance, that some fraction of the subjects care only about their material interest and the rest care only about their ideology. 29
In that case, variation in pivotality would have no e¤ect on behavior. Note, however, that this explanation strips the expressive voting model of its ability to explain why people vote against their material interests without invoking preferences that greatly di¤er from standard ones.
Finally, one can explain our data by assuming that ideology a¤ects individual's social preferences over outcomes of the election, rather than their expressive utility from their own actions. In that case, if I ideologically oppose redistribution, it would be psychologically more costly to vote for it when I am more likely to be pivotal. This explanation, however, also requires preferences that depart in substantial ways from standard ones.
Overall, our results cast doubt on the simplest way to reconcile empirical voting patterns with individual rationality. The striking similarity in behavior of dictators and peons is particularly noteworthy as it rules out a large class of models of expressive preferences. Identifying the types of models that can account for this similarity and examining their implications is a fruitful direction for further research.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1
The probability that a given voter is pivotal when m of the remaining n 1 voters choose redistribute is q (n)
Simple algebra reveals that this expression is strictly decreasing in n for all m. Hence, there exists n s.t. for all n > n :
Hence, when n > n , arg max v (a; i ) is a dominant strategy for every voter i. Choosing the other action reduces her expressive utility by at least " min i jv (redistribute; i ) v (statusQuo; i )j and can increase her expected material utility by no more than q (n) max i u (e i ) u 0.20 Notes: Linear probability model. *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%. The independent variable is measured on a Likert scale, using the question: You think that a participant's performance in the rock-paper-scissors segment of the study is due to: (1) luck -(7) skill. Notes: Linear probability model. *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%. F-tests compare the coefficients on Ideology across the samples. In columns (1) through (3), Ideology is measured on a Likert scale, using the the question: You believe that most poor people are poor because: (1) they are not motivated -(7) they are unlucky. In columns (4) through (6), Ideology is measured on a Likert scale, using the question: You think the government should: (1) raise taxes on the rich to help the poor -(7) lower taxes for everyone and reduce handouts to the poor. 
The survey
